

## East Africa

Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda

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### Overview

Over the last year, corruption continued to dominate political contests and development strategies in East Africa. The media still thrives on exposés of corrupt transactions in government, although there was an increase in reports about government efforts to establish or give teeth to existing anti-corruption institutions, and parliaments played a key role in holding governments to account. Across the region, there is ever more news of governments taking action against corrupt officials, as accusations of graft have become a major political weapon.

Yet the positive news stories do not always mean that governments in the region have seriously committed themselves to fight corruption. Anti-corruption institutions are frequently underfunded, and government actions are often just a veneer, intended to meet donor conditionality in a region where most governments depend on foreign aid to support their budgets.

International financial institutions had argued that liberalisation and privatisation would reduce the scale and scope of government, thereby minimising the incidence of corruption. After a decade of free market reforms, however, the state remains the largest consumer and employer. Market reforms merely altered the way in which corruption occurs, allowing governments to award contracts and tenders to reward loyal supporters or buy off potential opponents.

The pattern of corruption also partly reflects the many armed conflicts in the region, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. The conflicts have provided opportunities for illicit access to natural resources, and in some cases aid officials have taken advantage of the desperation of refugees.

Increasing evidence has emerged of the central role of the private sector in corruption in East Africa. Surveys and prominent cases hinted at the extent of bribes paid by both East African and multinational businesses and also at the level of private-to-private corruption and fraud.

In the fight against corruption, civil society organisations in Kenya and Uganda have played a prominent role. In several countries in the region, however, legal and political regimes have not been significantly improved to allow more effective and broad participation. While the liberalisation of the airwaves has made private FM

radio stations centres of lively political debate across the region, the media has faced heavy restrictions in Eritrea and Sudan.

### International and regional

The dependence of East African countries on foreign aid has subjected them to pressure from donors to introduce effective anti-corruption bodies. Owing mainly to this pressure, the government of President Daniel arap Moi recently drafted legislation in Kenya establishing an ethics code for public officials and an anti-corruption body; it also plans to reform the corruption-ridden judiciary.<sup>1</sup> Donor pressure was responsible for similar efforts in Uganda, Ethiopia and Tanzania. The leadership codes are unlikely to be enforced, however, and anti-corruption bodies are generally underfunded and denied effective powers. Uganda has had a leadership code for more than seven years, but it has had very little impact because of its weak enforcement mechanisms.

Ironically, the availability of international funds may have made governments more tolerant of corruption in tax administration.<sup>2</sup> Uganda depends on donors for 52 per cent of its public expenditure, and Tanzania 44 per cent, but there is little incentive for governments to antagonise the key political constituencies, which profit from corruption in the tax system.<sup>3</sup>

The year 2001–02 saw new regional initiatives. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union, prepared a draft convention on combating corruption in November 2001 that called for members to coordinate and harmonise their policies and legislation to detect, punish and eradicate corruption. The Southern African Development Community, of which Tanzania and the Seychelles are members, adopted a protocol against corruption at its summit in August 2001. But the problem in East Africa is less an absence of anti-corruption statements than the lack of political will to put them into effect.

Conflict continues to provide wide opportunities for corruption in the region. There have been wars in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, while three East African governments have been involved in the carve-up of the DRC, providing senior officers and their allies in the private sector with golden opportunities for profit. Conflict permits illicit gain from natural resources such as minerals and timber or, in the case of Somalia, from warlords' control of tax zones. Last year, Tanzania was added to the list of governments involved in covert activity in the DRC, with reports of close business ties between Tanzanian and Zimbabwean officials and army officers in the supply of military equipment to rebel factions in Burundi and Rwanda.<sup>4</sup>

In 2001 alone, a United Nations panel of investigators issued two reports that accused the Ugandan and Rwandan troops occupying parts of DRC of plundering its vast natural resources through illicit trade.<sup>5</sup> Uganda appointed its own official commission of inquiry, but its work was largely seen as an attempt to whitewash the

accused, who included members of the family of President Yoweri Museveni. International donors, whose financial support for government budgets releases funds to finance militarist policies, indirectly encourage these countries' military adventures. With Ugandan troops still deployed in both the DRC and Sudan, donors have allowed the Ugandan government to increase defence spending by US \$37 million over the next two years.<sup>6</sup>

Relief for the victims of armed conflict – refugees and internally displaced people – has opened further opportunities for corruption. In January 2002, UN investigators reported that workers in the Kenyan office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) accepted bribes totalling millions of dollars in the 1990s from refugees seeking to flee the continent.<sup>7</sup> Four UNHCR officials were arrested. UNHCR exposed a similar scam in Uganda in March 2002 and two officials were suspended.<sup>8</sup> Aid officials in the so-called 'protected villages' of northern Uganda were reported to have accepted bribes of sex and money in return for relief rations, while officers and soldiers took the same in return for 'protection'.<sup>9</sup> In southern Sudan, 'redeeming' or the buying back of slaves, a campaign that raised millions of dollars in charity in the United States and other developed countries, is rife with corruption. Commanders of the Sudan People's Liberation Army reportedly pocketed much of the money paid to buy captives' freedom, in some cases passing off free men and women as slaves in order to keep the payments coming.<sup>10</sup>

The consequences of the events of September 11th may have a negative impact on civil society in the region. Governments have sought to exploit 'the war against terror' to pass draconian laws that limit freedom of the press and expression. In Uganda, a new anti-terrorism bill is threatening to redefine criticism of the government as a new form of 'terrorism'. Furthermore, the fight against terror has justified further rises in military and intelligence agency budgets, increasing the scope for 'classified expenditure' and its accompanying abuse. Recent examples of allegedly corrupt arms deals – second-hand lorries in Kenya, helicopters in Uganda – provided insight into a world of classified expenditure where corruption is particularly hard to uncover.

## National

For several years past, most news of corruption in East Africa concerned specific cases of graft. Most current news reports on the subject concern government efforts to establish anti-corruption mechanisms and affirmations of their resolve to combat the malady. It is a decidedly mixed development. While there have been genuine efforts to combat corruption, many measures taken by governments are intended to please donors and other national or international constituencies. And where governments have established anti-corruption institutions, they tend to be underfunded, a factor that undermines their effectiveness. One worrying side effect of the

war against corruption in the region, moreover, is that it has provided governments with a new pretext for persecuting their political opponents and stamping out other centres of dissent.

Kenya has been engaged in a protracted process of putting in place an anti-corruption body since the high court declared the Kenya Anti-corruption Authority (KACA) unconstitutional in December 2000. The bill to create the Kenya Corruption Control Authority was tabled before parliament in April 2002. Also before parliament is the Public Officers Ethics Bill, which will make it mandatory for public servants, including the president, to declare their wealth every year.<sup>11</sup> The introduction of the new bills followed a report by a team of British anti-graft experts who had been commissioned by the government; the effort was criticised as being primarily a donor relations exercise.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, Kenya continues to lag behind its neighbours in institutionalising anti-corruption efforts. Besides an office of 'inspector-general of government' (IGG), Uganda has a ministry of ethics and integrity; Tanzania has a national anti-corruption strategy and a minister for good governance; and Ethiopia passed legislation in May 2001 to establish a Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission (FEACC).

Throughout the region, however, anti-corruption institutions are starved of funds. In April 2002, Uganda's parliament strengthened the IGG's role in principle by passing a new leadership code that empowers it to make known the assets declared by a public official upon receiving a 'justified' request from a member of the public. The impact of the legislation is yet to be seen, but the prognosis is not good in view of the IGG's lack of proper funding,<sup>13</sup> which in turn mirrors limited political support for effective anti-corruption measures. The Ugandan government currently spends 1.1 per cent of its budget on accountability institutions while security officially absorbs 14 per cent.<sup>14</sup> Tanzania has seen a significant expansion of capacity in its anti-corruption bureau but a 2002 report on corruption cited a wide range of areas of government in which corruption is extensive, including tax administration, the judiciary, public procurement, privatisation, local administration and the social services. The report also specified inadequate funding as a central cause of corruption in the judiciary.<sup>15</sup>

Across the region, action against the corrupt is principally taken when the political interests of those in power are not directly threatened. Between November 2001 and April 2002, Kenyan police arraigned 77 people in various courts on corruption charges.<sup>16</sup> Most of them were low-ranking officials from district treasuries, the immigration department and the Kenya Revenue Authority. No actions were taken against cabinet ministers or high-ranking government officials. In Ethiopia, the FEACC, in one of its first major cases, filed charges of corruption against 41 past and present officials of the Ethiopian Commercial Bank.<sup>17</sup> Charges were also brought against 12 former heads of government institutions and businessmen arrested in May 2001. One of the accused was leader of a dissident group within the ruling party.<sup>18</sup>

In Uganda, Justice Julia Sebutinde's commission of inquiry into corruption in the police force in 1999 recommended that certain police officers be dismissed. The officers were considered hostile to the regime, and the government acted.<sup>19</sup> But her second commission, which in 2001 investigated alleged corruption in the purchase of sub-standard military helicopters, allegedly implicated the president's brother.<sup>20</sup> Her report has not been made public and there has been no follow-up since it was submitted to the defence ministry in August 2001.<sup>21</sup>

The self-interest of those in power makes it remarkably difficult to mobilise public services in the fight against corruption. Where strong action has been taken, it has often been because of the leadership quality of the head of a particular state agency. Uganda's auditor-general's office, for example, largely maintained its high standards thanks to the efforts of its former head, James Kahooza, and his successor, John Mwangi.

The tendency of senior government officials not to get caught is, however, not uniform across the region. An important indication that high-level corruption can be challenged in Tanzania has been seen in the long-running trial of Nalaila Kiula, former minister for works, communication and transport, on charges relating to the misappropriation of US \$3.7 million of donor funds intended for road construction. Others on trial in the case included the former permanent secretary and other senior civil servants in the ministry.<sup>22</sup> In a more recent case, a parliamentary investigation into illegal sugar import licensing prompted the resignation in November 2001 of Tanzania's minister of industry and trade. The minister had allegedly issued licences to companies that were not registered to import sugar in exchange for illegal payments. Calls for his resignation had come from MPs within his own party.<sup>23</sup>

The interaction of corruption, drug trafficking and money laundering is a growing problem in the region. A leaked security document in Uganda details how senior military and security officers were colluding with narcotics dealers to turn the country into a transit point for drug trafficking.<sup>24</sup> No action was taken against the culprits. Allegations of money laundering and drug trafficking were also made during the 2001 elections in the Seychelles, where opposition politicians accused the government of turning the country into a haven for drug and mafia money laundering.<sup>25</sup>

Official disdain for the opposition as a legitimate actor in politics significantly weakens a crucial mechanism for making governments in the region accountable, though opposition parties are sometimes also involved in corruption. In Uganda, the activities of political parties are restricted to the calling of press conferences. Kenya's ruling party openly uses corruption – the lure of state jobs – to buy off opposition politicians and limit dissent within its own ranks. Ethiopia's coalition government is generally held together by the ability of the ruling party to keep the pockets of its partners oiled, while it openly suppresses the opposition. Sudan's government imposed strict restrictions on opposition politicians, while in late 2001 the

## Measuring the burden of bribery

Read the paper or listen to the news in Kenya, and corruption features frequently. It is even the subject of a well-known song, '*Nchi ya Kitu Kidogo*' (Country of Bribes), in which Kenyan musician Eric Wainana sings about the *kitu kidogo* (a little something) demanded by traffic police. A survey has now been carried out that attempts to measure for the first time the burden of bribery in Kenyans' lives. The strong reactions to the survey indicate how corruption has become so politicised in the country. In the past there has been very little information about bribery in Kenya, despite its prevalence. The Kenya Urban Bribery Index (KUBI), carried out by Transparency International Kenya and launched in January 2002, aimed to provide the anti-corruption effort with rigorous, objective research. KUBI is based on a survey of 1,164 individuals from several Kenyan towns.

The average urban Kenyan pays 16 bribes a month, the survey found, amounting to a burden of bribes of KSh 8,185 (US \$104) per month – compared to an average monthly income among the survey respondents of only KSh 26,000 (US \$331). Public servants are bribed the most, accounting for 99 per cent of all bribery transactions and 97 per cent of the total value of bribes given. Other bribes are made to the private sector and foreign organisations, such as embassies and international agencies.

The survey resulted in the creation of a national bribery league, which ranks institutions according to the number and amount of bribes they extract. The worst offenders were found to be the police, with an index score of 68.7 out of a maximum of 100. Six out of 10 urban residents reported paying bribes to the police, observing that failure to do so leads to mistreatment or the denial of service. Police officers exacted the largest 'bribery tax', equivalent to KSh 2,670 (US \$34) per person per month. The second-worst offender was the ministry of public works

(with a score of 41.0), followed by the immigration department (36.1). The institution found to be the least prone to bribes was the central bank (0.2).

Not surprisingly, the release of the index received mixed reviews. Spokespersons for the Kenyan police argued that the report was aimed at tarnishing government efforts to fight corruption and that it was 'malicious propaganda'. The then secretary-general of the Kenya African National Union, Kenya's ruling party, said that TI Kenya's report 'was exaggerated, inauthentic and meant to discredit the government and the ruling party'. A spokesperson for the prisons department said the findings were mere allegations and that no corruption existed in the department, challenging TI Kenya to cite specific incidents of bribery by department officials. Meanwhile, the managing director of Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, the state-owned television, radio and news service, observed that they were unaware of the existence of corruption in their organisation and questioned TI's criteria. Nevertheless, some of the bodies cited in the survey accepted the findings. The deputy mayor of Nairobi city council, for example, agreed that the institution was among the most corrupt in Kenya. Comically, but perhaps most significantly, for two weeks after the KUBI was released, the roadblocks at which police demand bribes from *matatus* (public transport) – the subject of Eric Wainanu's song – totally disappeared.

TI Kenya plans to conduct and release this survey yearly. It is hoped that the data in the index will be useful to policy-makers and will generate more research. It should provide a benchmark of integrity so that organisations can assess the impact of efforts to reduce corruption.

The Kenya Urban Bribery Index can be downloaded from [www.tikenya.org](http://www.tikenya.org).

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Eritrean government took a series of repressive measures against political opposition that were criticised by human rights observers.<sup>26</sup>

Nevertheless, parliaments in some countries are demonstrably rising to the challenge of official corruption. Uganda's parliament is currently investigating alleged fraud in the sale of Uganda Commercial Bank.<sup>27</sup> In Somalia, in October 2001, parliament passed a vote of no confidence in the transitional government of Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galayd, in part because of its failure to address corruption.<sup>28</sup> Earlier in the year, Somalia's minister of finance, Sayyid Ahmad Shaykh Dahir, reportedly admitted in parliament that he had taken part in the misappropriation of US \$3.5 million. Allegedly, he admitted taking US \$200,000 for 'personal use' and claimed the prime minister had taken US \$1 million and the governor of the central bank a further US \$1.5 million.<sup>29</sup>

The September 2001 elections in the Seychelles were dominated by claims that the ruling party had used the resources of the monolithic Seychelles Marketing Board and the public transport monopoly to win the election.<sup>30</sup> In Kenya, the national branch of the African Parliamentary Network against Corruption played a key role in challenging the government's legislative plans. They provided detailed criticism of proposed legislation in mid-2001 and, together with other groups, lobbied for the reinstatement of the KACA.<sup>31</sup>

### Private sector

Uganda's current IGG, Jotham Tumwesigye, asserted in an interview that the private sector fuelled most of the corruption in his country, particularly in government procurement and income tax assessment.<sup>32</sup> The secretary-general of Kenya's ruling party echoed the charge in May 2002.<sup>33</sup> When poorly paid civil servants have authority to approve multimillion-dollar contracts for multinational corporations or local companies, the incentives for private sector corruption are considerable.

A KPMG survey of more than 400 CEOs and chief financial officers, released in June 2002, strongly suggested that fraud and corruption in business are on the rise in East Africa. Fraud was considered a major problem by 61 per cent of respondents and 88 per cent said their companies had suffered from fraud during the previous year. Weak internal controls were seen as a key factor, but respondents also cited the increasing sophistication of criminals and the inefficiencies of the justice system.<sup>34</sup>

Bribery by multinational companies trying to win local business is often the source of public sector corruption. A new power plant was commissioned in Tanzania in January 2002, reigniting allegations that the Malaysian company that constructed it paid off government officials.<sup>35</sup> The controversial contract for a US \$40 million air traffic control system between British Aerospace and the government was criticised by World Bank aviation experts. In May 2002, the

## Access to information in East Africa

No country in the region has freedom of information legislation, although Kenya is in the process of drafting some relevant laws. A draft access to information bill was published in Kenya nearly two years ago though it has since remained on the shelf. The Ugandan constitution provides for public access to information, but no law has been passed to put this right into effect seven years since it was enacted.

Faced with increasing parliamentary scrutiny, civil society activism and media vigilance, governments in the region are stonewalling. At a time when President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and other politicians have won several defamation suits against newspapers and bookshops, a new media control law was passed in parliament in May 2002. The law increased the cost of the compulsory libel insurance bond from KShs 10,000 to 1 million (from US \$130 to \$13,000), signalling a clear intent to bankrupt publications that are critical.<sup>1</sup>

State-owned television steers clear of covering corruption, but private FM radio stations and newspapers are centres of open criticism of wrongdoing by public officials. One media owner involved in exposing graft in Tanzania was recently denied citizenship there even though he had held public office for 30 years.<sup>2</sup> In November 2001, Sudanese police detained

30 journalists, all employees of an independent daily, *Al-Watan*.<sup>3</sup> They were arrested after marching to the ministry of information to protest against a decision by censors to ban the publication for planning to publish a story about a fraudulent deal involving expired pharmaceutical drugs. Access to information is even more restricted in Eritrea. In September 2001, all private newspapers in Eritrea were banned, leaving the government-owned *Hadas Eritrea* as the only publication in the country.<sup>4</sup> According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, more journalists are currently imprisoned in Eritrea than in any other African country.<sup>5</sup>

Throughout East Africa the battle to expose corrupt transactions has been led by the press. Yet press laws, both criminal and civil, are the biggest stumbling block in journalists' onward march to expose more corruption. The arrests of journalists in Eritrea and Sudan show how accessing information remains a risky undertaking.

- 1 Human Rights Watch, press release, 10 May 2002.
- 2 TI Tanzania.
- 3 Network for the Defence of Independent Media in Africa (NDIMA), Nairobi, 23 November 2001.
- 4 Committee to Protect Journalists, press release, 25 September 2001.
- 5 Committee to Protect Journalists, press release, 3 April 2002.

British minister for overseas development repeated accusations that Tanzanian officials had taken bribes in the radar system deal, though she admitted she had no proof.<sup>36</sup>

Also in Tanzania, in a possible case of private-to-private corruption, employees of oil multinational BP were alleged to have demanded bribes from a local contractor. BP allegedly cancelled a contract at short notice when the local company refused to pay the bribes. In October 2001, following complaints from the local contractor, BP set up an independent inquiry into the allegations.<sup>37</sup>

During the elections held in the Seychelles in September 2001, opposition parties attacked the government of President France-Albert René for 'corruption, off-shore banking ... money laundering and plunder'.<sup>38</sup> The allegations were fuelled by claims

that Russian and other mafia and drug dealers' organisations were using the Seychelles as a safe haven for their money.

In spite of studies showing the harmful effect of graft on private sector investment, business as a constituency has not been vocal in the fight against corruption in East Africa.

### Civil society

Civil society organisations are active in the fight against corruption in some countries in the region, although Sudan, Eritrea and, to a lesser extent, Ethiopia are exceptions. All three suffer from restricted press freedoms.

In Uganda, civil society organisations were at the forefront of attempts to pressure the government into making its methods of awarding tenders more transparent. During 2001, they petitioned the World Bank to send a panel of investigators to establish, among other things, whether there was corruption in the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) between the government and the U.S. multinational AES to construct the US \$550 million Bujagali dam. The World Bank did subsequently send an inspection panel; its report criticised numerous aspects of the project, including the World Bank's decision to keep the PPA secret.<sup>39</sup> In June 2002, the World Bank announced it was suspending its loan for the dam because of corruption allegations.<sup>40</sup>

Governments are beginning to engage civil society organisations as partners in the fight against corruption, with the support of the international donor community. In November 2001, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the office of the attorney-general in Kenya joined an initiative with Transparency International and other civil society groups against corruption. UNDP helped organise a workshop to create a common platform for tackling corruption.<sup>41</sup>

In June 2001, 50 panellists from non-governmental organisations, government departments and press agencies in Ethiopia attended a workshop on corruption.<sup>42</sup> It is not yet clear whether this marks an improvement in relations between the state and civil society, which were previously poor. Governments are aware of the need to appear progressive to donors, but whether this cooperation will become institutionalised remains to be seen.

Although the press has been vigilant in exposing cases of graft in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and governments are learning to live with a critical media, anti-press laws have not been repealed. In the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland, a newspaper alleged that President Mohammed Ibrahim Egal made a commitment in February 2002 to pay members of the House of Elders in exchange for extending his term of office. The elders responded by threatening to sue the newspaper.<sup>43</sup>

A growing trend in the region is the cooperation between civil society, parliamentarians, government officials and donors in the fight against corruption. The attention given to local organisations and groups reflects both a growing recognition of

civil society's effectiveness in forcing change and donor support for civil society. It is increasingly common in several countries for officials to leak information on corrupt transactions to the media or parliamentarians. More formally, the African Parliamentary Network against Corruption, launched at a regional seminar in Uganda in 1999, formed a chapter in Kenya in 2001 that has been working closely with TI Kenya.

In an attempt to further institutionalise cooperation between civil society organisations and African governments, the Second OAU-Civil Society Conference, held in Ethiopia in June 2002, focused on mechanisms for interaction between African civil society and the African Union. OAU Secretary-General Amara Essy acknowledged that 'the rule of law, governmental accountability, peace and security are key to the social, economic and political development of Africa. All of these require, as a necessary condition for their success, a strong and autonomous civil society.'<sup>44</sup>

- 1 *East African* (Kenya), 25 March 2002; Africa Online, 24 April 2002.
- 2 *Sunday Monitor* (Uganda), 10 February 2002.
- 3 The 2001–02 Budget of Uganda, and the 2001–02 Budget of Tanzania.
- 4 *Africa Confidential* (Britain), 19 April 2002.
- 5 The first and second UN reports were released on 12 April ([www.un.org/news/dh/latest/drcongo.htm](http://www.un.org/news/dh/latest/drcongo.htm)) and 10 November 2001 ([www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/2001/1072e.pdf](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/2001/1072e.pdf)), respectively.
- 6 *Sunday Monitor* (Uganda), 26 May 2002.
- 7 Reuters, 27 February 2002.
- 8 Interview with Saihou Saïdy, UNHCR Country Representative, on 17 June 2002.
- 9 Africa Rights, *Operation Iron Fist: What Price for Peace in Northern Uganda?* (Kampala: Africa Rights, May 2002).
- 10 *Washington Post* (US), 26 February 2002.
- 11 *Nation* (Kenya), 5 April 2002.
- 12 *East African* (Kenya), 21 January 2002; IRIN, 23 April 2002.
- 13 Interview with Jotham Tumwesigye, inspector-general of government, 17 May 2002.
- 14 Draft estimates for the 2001–02 budget of the Republic of Uganda.
- 15 Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) and Front against Corrupt Elements in Tanzania (FACEIT), *The State of Corruption in Tanzania Annual Report 2001*, 2nd draft (Dar es Salaam: ESRF/FACEIT, June 2002).
- 16 *East African Standard* (Kenya), 12 April 2002.
- 17 BBC News, 9 January 2002.
- 18 IRIN, 27 October–2 November 2001.
- 19 *Monitor* (Uganda), 10 June 2001.
- 20 *East African* (Kenya), 6 August 2001.
- 21 *Sunday Monitor* (Uganda), 2 September 2001.
- 22 Tomric News Agency (Tanzania), 29 June 2001; *Guardian* (Tanzania), 11 March 2002.
- 23 Tomric News Agency (Tanzania), 5 November 2001; BBC News, 8 August 2001.
- 24 *Monitor* (Uganda), 14 October 2001.
- 25 *Africa Confidential* (Britain), 14 September 2001.
- 26 Human Rights Watch, *Escalating Crackdown in Eritrea: Reformists, Journalists, Students at Risk*, press release, 21 September 2001.
- 27 *Monitor* (Uganda), 21 May 2002.
- 28 *East African* (Kenya), 12 November 2001.
- 29 IRIN, *Horn of Africa Update*, 28 June 2001.
- 30 *Africa Confidential* (Britain) 42, no. 18, 14 September 2001.
- 31 *Adili*, no.4 (Nairobi: Transparency International Kenya, 25 February 2002).
- 32 Interview with author.
- 33 *New Vision* (Uganda), 24 May 2002.
- 34 *East African Standard* (Kenya), 20 June 2002.
- 35 IRIN, 13 May 2002.
- 36 *East African* (Kenya), 20–26 May 2002; *The Guardian* (Britain), 26 June 2002.

- 37 *Economist* (Britain), 28 February 2002.
- 38 *Africa Confidential* (Britain) 42, no. 18, 14 September 2001.
- 39 International Rivers Network, *A Review of the World Bank's Inspection Panel Report on the Bujagali Hydropower Project* (Berkeley: International Rivers Network, June 2002).
- 40 *East African* (Kenya), 8 July 2002.
- 41 [www.undp.org/dpa/frontpagearchive/2001/november/7nov01](http://www.undp.org/dpa/frontpagearchive/2001/november/7nov01).
- 42 Ethiopian News Agency, 19 June 2001.
- 43 *Somaliland Times* (Somalia), 2 March 2002.
- 44 [www.africa-union.org/en/speech.asp?id=84](http://www.africa-union.org/en/speech.asp?id=84).