Southern Africa

Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe

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Overview

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) seeks to obtain an investment inflow of more than US $60 billion annually to Africa. It is an ambitious target, and success will depend in large part on investor perceptions of governance. Recent electoral frauds in Zambia and Zimbabwe, in addition to the breakdown of the rule of law in Zimbabwe, have contributed to investor nervousness in Southern Africa, making the target still harder to achieve, though confidence in the South African economy remains strong.

The indebtedness of most Southern African countries and their dependence on external aid are powerful incentives to demonstrate good governance to donors and investors. Indeed, though NEPAD officials have yet to spell out the precise standards of good governance to which participating countries will be expected to subscribe, some governments in the region have already made formal commitments to anti-corruption principles.

Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence of institutional resistance to the implementation of effective measures that address and reduce corruption. Efforts to control corruption were undermined by political interference in a major investigation into arms procurement in South Africa; by a reluctance to prosecute following the murder of corruption investigators in Mozambique; and by non-compliance with parliamentary asset disclosure requirements in several other countries. Meanwhile, two significant instances of electoral fraud – and their apparent toleration by neighbouring states – raise worrying questions about the future of liberal democratic institutions across the region. This is particularly true in Angola and Mozambique, where the ruling parties harbour ingrained ideological objections to such institutions and the codes of governance they represent.

Though private sector corruption receives less media attention than its public counterpart, a series of banking scandals in South Africa has prompted business organisations to lobby for and institute stronger corporate governance procedures.

Civil society organisations are increasingly engaged in anti-corruption work, although reports from Zimbabwe suggest that some NGOs may also be implicated in misconduct. Despite an expansion of freedom of information legislation in certain countries, late 2001 witnessed a general growth of government hostility to independent media, with stringent anti-press measures introduced in Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

International and regional

NEPAD assumed institutional form in October 2001 with the creation of its secretariat in Midrand, South Africa. The partnership's goal is to become the key agency on the continent for the promotion of economic progress, poverty reduction and democracy. The NEPAD draft charter articulated an ambitious list of objectives while recognising that the resources needed to achieve them would depend upon its members' fulfilment of commitments to good governance, including the elimination of corruption. The G8 governments have offered polite endorsement of the NEPAD programme, but its long-term success will require the consolidation of external business confidence in Africa.

While heavily indebted governments might be expected to be particularly susceptible to donor pressure to limit financial mismanagement, the opposite is often the case. Southern African governments have, on the one hand, elaborated codes of conduct and the agencies to police them. But, on the other, the same governments often resort to populist rhetoric in which international bodies are portrayed as undermining national sovereignty by their sponsorship of 'unpatriotic' opposition to national authority.

For example, in January 2002 President Bakili Muluzi of Malawi condemned donor efforts to influence internal politics in comments reportedly directed at Denmark, which had been critical of corruption and human rights abuses.[1] Denmark subsequently withdrew development assistance, citing corruption and intolerance of political opposition,[2] and Britain suspended budgetary support in early 2002.[3] In March the International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission asked the government to expedite long-standing corruption cases involving parastatal companies.[4]

In Zambia, newly elected president Levy Mwanawasa used his inaugural address to launch a stinging attack on bilateral donors that 'supported anarchy' (but also provide 50 per cent of the government budget). Accusations of fraud in the elections of December 2001 had severely tested the donors' commitment to combat corruption in Zambia. In principle, compliance with governance conditions influences donor contributions to the Zambian budget, but this assumption has to be questioned in the absence of any real penalties imposed after the election.

Some instances of donor-leveraged anti-corruption reforms proved beneficial, in spite of the political resentment aroused. An IMF-sponsored programme in Angola, signed in April 2000, had produced tangible results by the time it was evaluated in July 2001. The programme's goals included a diagnostic audit by KPMG of the controversial oil sector, a reduction in off-budget expenditure and a general increase in fiscal transparency. Angola's qualification for future loans was made conditional on completion of the programme. After 15 months, the IMF reported that, although the government had not fully complied with the conditions, progress included quarterly reports from the diagnostic study and a measure of success in directing previously secret expenditure into regulated channels. Nevertheless, only a fraction of Angola's revenue from oil is officially acknowledged in government budgets.

External pressure on Mozambique prompted the formation in December 2001 of an official anti-corruption unit under the attorney-general's office. Its first focus was on bribe-taking in the judiciary.[5] Efforts by the UK-based financial management company Crown Agents to clean up corruption in Mozambique's extensive ports system proved ineffectual, despite the establishment of a new anti-corruption unit in the port customs service in October 2000. Crown Agents reported increased revenue collections, but the prevalence of dishonest behaviour among port officials was largely unchanged.[6]

Joint action by Mozambique and Botswana on anti-corruption measures was part of a wider regional trend. In February 2002, the Southern African Regulatory Police Chairs Coordinating Committee met in Johannesburg to consider ways of strengthening legislation against money laundering.[7] The collaboration resulted partly from fears of financial transfers by international terrorist organisations.

But it is the adoption of an anti-corruption protocol by the heads of state and governments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in August 2001 that may prove the region's most significant initiative.[8] The protocol, adopted at the Malawi summit, covers a range of preventive measures, including codes of conduct, access to information and whistleblower protection. It also requires governments to criminalise the bribery of foreign public servants, thus making corruption an extraditable offence.

A committee organised by the Southern African Forum against Corruption (SAFAC) will monitor compliance with the protocol.[9] SAFAC was launched in June

Zapiro, South Africa

2000 with the sponsorship of nine SADC governments to facilitate regional cooperation between anti-corruption agencies. In 2001 SAFAC helped the Lesotho government establish its Directorate of Anti-corruption and Economic Offences.[10]

National

In April 2002 a ceasefire between the Angolan government and UNITA rebels raised the prospect of an end to the region's longest war. The advent of peace in Angola may create fresh public pressure for openness in government use of petrodollars. Only a month before the ceasefire, the NGO Global Witness had published a scathing report on 'the mechanisms of wholesale state robbery in Angola', calling for full transparency in the oil and banking sectors.[11] Ideological resistance, however, will remain a formidable obstacle to political and economic reform.

Similarly, in Mozambique, the revival after the 1999 elections of the left wing of the governing party, FRELIMO, strengthened opposition to economic liberalisation. Antipathy to market reforms within sections of FRELIMO's leadership may afford a degree of protection to corrupt individuals within the party hierarchy. The ascendancy of traditional party ideologues is believed to have contributed to judicial reluctance to prosecute in fraud cases involving senior officials.[12]

The electoral fraud in Zambia and Zimbabwe during the year set back the development of good governance across the region, in view of the fact that they did not attract the censure of other SADC governments. Widespread suspicions of fraud in the Zambian presidential and parliamentary elections of December 2001 were substantiated in a European Union (EU) report. EU observers found that the 100 per cent turn-out in certain districts was 'simply not credible', particularly in the absence of any spoilt ballots. Vote rigging was suspected in at least three provinces.[13]

Corruption is pervasive in Zimbabwe, and a recent UN economic report commented that 'many of the problems across sectors in Zimbabwe can be linked to one central difficulty: the "crisis of governance"'.[14] The Zimbabwean presidential elections in 2002 were widely construed as unfair after the authorities reduced the number of polling stations in the opposition's urban strongholds, forcing voters to queue for 30 hours.[15] In rural areas 400,000 names were allegedly added to the register after the official closure of registration.[16] Significant discrepancies between the Electoral Supervisory Commission's results and the final count released by the Registrar General led Commonwealth observers to accuse the ruling party of ballot box stuffing on a large scale.[17]

Yet SADC governments declared the outcome 'legitimate', notwithstanding criticism by observers from the region's parliamentary forum as well as the largely African Commonwealth team. President Robert Mugabe's victory reduced the chances of administrative reform in a government that has presided over major abuses of executive authority.

Elsewhere in Southern Africa, the signals of political will to address corruption were ambivalent within government and official agencies. Major scandals in Malawi and Mozambique indicated high-level resistance to official investigations of corruption. The tender for running Malawi Telecommunications (MTL) was awarded to a group that included the minister of information and MTL's chairperson, who is also the wife of the minister for presidential affairs. The Anti-corruption Bureau arrested four senior MTL officials for improprieties in the tendering process, but they subsequently resumed work after being granted bail, rather than being suspended on full pay.

In Mozambique, the prosecution of six men charged in May 2001 with the murder of journalist Carlos Cardoso encountered many obstacles, and the Cardoso family was subjected to various kinds of harassment. Cardoso is believed to have been murdered because of his investigation into the theft of US $14 million during the privatisation of the Commercial Bank of Mozambique. In a separate case, Antonio Siba Siba Macuacua, the Central Bank official appointed chairman of Austral Bank, was murdered in August 2001. At the time, he had been investigating outstanding loans at the bank, which collapsed in April 2001 after it failed to recover soft loans. Its portfolio is believed to have included many loans to politicians.

More encouragingly, the region's most important corruption trial ended in June 2002 with the conviction of Masupha Ephraim Sole, former CEO of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, who was sentenced to 18 years in prison on bribery charges. Evidence confirmed that Sole's Swiss bank account had been credited with millions of rand from international consultancy firms involved in the dam construction project. The firms themselves were due to go to trial in late 2002.

In Zambia, there were some signs of executive determination to counter official corruption. In March 2002, President Levy Mwanawasa launched a National Movement against Corruption.[18] Earlier, in his inaugural speech, Mwanawasa had called for the legislature to take up issues arising from reports by the auditor-general and the Anti-corruption Commission.[19] Mwanawasa was chosen to succeed former president Frederick Chiluba as candidate for the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) partly because of his corruption-free record, although his selection for foreign minister, Katele Kalumba, was accused in 2001 of diverting state funds to the MMD when he was finance minister. Though Kalumba was cleared, two of his cabinet colleagues were convicted.[20] Mwanawasa's assertion that his government would 'demand honesty and integrity' and afford 'no room for corruption' evoked a cynical reaction in the press.[21] Meanwhile, the Anti-corruption Commission began to investigate allegedly corrupt dealings between the Chiluba government and foreign oil companies over the purchase of local oil refinery shares.[22]

The most serious accusations of corruption against an incumbent administration, however, concerned arms procurement in South Africa. After a joint investigation by the directorate of public prosecutions, the public protector and the auditor-general, a report was released to parliament in November 2001 that exonerated members of President Thabo Mbeki's cabinet, but expressed serious reservations about the administration of tendering procedures. Officials who had received gifts from bidders were mentioned by name in the report, which also alleged that the defence department's chief of acquisitions had favoured companies in which his brother had a stake.[23] By no means the 'whitewash' that the political opposition claimed, the report was, nonetheless, too charitable in its exoneration of the government; a more stringent code of accountability would have held ministers responsible for misdemeanours by officials in their departments.

By convention, the South African parliament's Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) functions as a cross-party body, reaching its decisions through consensus. This principle came under serious strain when President Mbeki rejected its recommendation that the powerful Special Investigations Unit, led by Judge Willem Heath, should participate in the arms scandal inquiry. In August 2001, Andrew Feinstein, one of the authors of the SCOPA report that supported Judge Heath and a member of parliament for the ruling African National Congress (ANC), resigned from parliament in protest at the alleged efforts of cabinet ministers to 'rein' him in.[24] The ANC chief whip, who insisted that SCOPA's ANC members operate 'under party discipline', was forced to resign in October 2001 after being charged with corruption and perjury over his acceptance of a car from one of the subcontractors in the arms deal. SCOPA's chairman also resigned in February 2002 when a final effort to persuade the ANC majority on the committee to restore its traditional bipartisan approach came to nothing. His replacement by an interim chair from the ANC further weakened the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight of the executive.

Executive dispositions to counter corruption need to be fully matched by parliamentary determination. The Botswana national assembly enacted a law in 2001 that requires comprehensive asset disclosure by members of parliament, though on a register that remains confidential. In Namibia, parliamentarians delayed the establishment of an assets register, ostensibly because of the complexity of the forms they would be required to complete. In South Africa the extent of parliamentary commitment to asset disclosure was tested by the half-hearted efforts of its ethics committee to establish the extent of member of parliament Winnie Madikizela-Mandela's private interests, following her failure to disclose monthly gifts from supporters and the proceeds from several businesses. Despite expressions of dissatisfaction over her reluctance to provide the information, the ethics committee reached no decision.

In Southern Africa, only the very weakest provisions exist to compel political parties to disclose their financial interests and any donations they receive, creating wide opportunities for illicit private influence over government decision-making. In March 2002, it was revealed that Taiwan gave the ANC US $11 million in 1994 in a bid to prevent Nelson Mandela's government from transferring its diplomatic recognition of Taiwanese sovereignty to the People's Republic.[25]

Corruption in Zambia's electoral process

The presidential and legislative elections in Zambia in December 2001 were marked by allegations of vote buying, lack of transparency and an uneven playing field. It was the third national elections since the reintroduction of multiparty politics a decade earlier, but the mood in which they were held was a far cry from the optimism that characterised the 1991 polls. Eleven parties contested the elections. Four of them had broken away from the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) when, contrary to the constitution, President Frederick Chiluba attempted to run for a third term of office. Civil society and church groups that had succeeded in opposing the president's third-term ambitions tried to mobilise public opinion against the ruling party.

The elections took place against a background of unbridled state authoritarianism, rampant corruption and deep-rooted poverty for more than 75 per cent of the population. But elections in Zambia are not fought on issues such as these. For much of the electorate they are an opportunity to obtain gifts from those aspiring to office, whether *chitenges* (traditional Zambian clothing) or cash. Whoever provides the most gifts wins the most votes.

Chiluba's preferred successor, Levy Mwanawasa, won the election, though his margin was narrow and the opposition acquired a slender majority in the National Assembly for the first time in Zambian history. Election observers all commented on bias in the conduct of the elections, skewed in favour of the MMD. Local observers – Coalition 2001 and the Foundation for Democratic Process – as well as the European Union and the Carter Center all flagged inadequacies in voter registration, the misuse of state resources and unbalanced media coverage.

A survey undertaken by TI Zambia on perceptions of corruption in the electoral process indicates that the level of corruption was extremely high, as was respondents' tolerance of it. Most respondents admitted that, although corruption had negative effects on the country, they would still accept bribes for their votes if they were offered. They said this was the only way they knew how to benefit from the system. Their view reflects the inadequacies of electoral laws, which do not prohibit the distribution of relief food, agricultural implements or money during the campaign period.

Election monitoring organisations were unequivocal in stating that all of Zambia's political parties indulged in corrupt campaign practices. Party representatives said that it was impossible to win an election without corruption unless major changes were made to the electoral laws and the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) became more effective in rooting out corruption. Both the government and the ECZ lacked the will to address these defects or to ensure that the 2001 elections were administered effectively or transparently. In fact, the ECZ has neither the legal authority nor the institutional capacity to combat electoral fraud. The ECZ cannot prosecute anyone for electoral malpractice, nor disqualify candidates engaged in corruption. No law regulates electoral campaign financing and neither political parties nor candidates are required to disclose their sources of financing. Powerful forces, such as criminal cartels, can acquire inordinate influence by financing electoral campaigns, while the ruling party is free to underwrite its own operations by drawing from public funds.

Electoral corruption erodes one of the fundamental pillars of good governance – ethical leadership. As long as politicians are allowed to bribe their way to victory, leaders will be elected for no better reason than the number of *chitenges* they hand out.

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Similarly, in Zimbabwe, the investment arm of the ruling ZANU PF party, Zidco Holdings, was alleged to be a vehicle for the enrichment of party leadership, according to a TI Zimbabwe report, *New Scramble for Africa*, published in April 2002. Zidco never publishes audited statements or any other financial records, the authors maintain, nor does it use profits to fund party activities. Zidco controls a range of commercial interests in the country, and its subsidiaries are heavily involved in enterprises in the Democratic Republic of Congo that are secured through the protection and influence of the Zimbabwean army.

In a number of countries in the region, the architecture of anti-corruption institutions has continued to undergo construction. Besides establishing an anti-corruption unit in the attorney-general's office, Mozambique has introduced a revised commercial code to replace Portuguese legislation dating from the 19th century. Intended to reduce red tape, the reformed code's implementation has been very slow. Disappointingly, draft legislation to establish an 'independent and impartial' anti-corruption commission in Namibia was rejected in February 2002 by the upper house of parliament, which voted instead that the commission's duties be assigned to the existing ombudsman's office.[26] The creation of a separate commission had reflected a widespread view that the ombudsman's office had been ineffective in combating corruption.[27]

Private sector

Venal management is common business practice even in Southern African countries with relatively undeveloped private sectors. Malawi's Anti-corruption Bureau reported 175 allegations of corruption involving the private sector in the first three months of 2002, out of a total of 1,756 complaints.[28] Private sector corruption receives considerably less public attention than its public counterpart, though it is almost as pervasive.

Despite its international reputation for technical sophistication and good regulation, South Africa's local banking industry is also scarred by corruption. A succession of bank failures in 2001, while not always featuring dishonest practices, drew attention to shortcomings within the management of the banking sector, particularly those involved in micro-lending. In the case of the Regal Treasury Private Bank, a public commission of inquiry reported on misconduct by the bank's founder and allegations of Regal buying its own shares.[29] As a consequence of the commission's recommendations, the powers of the Registrar of Banks will shortly be extended to allow for the removal of rogue directors and intervention in the composition of boards.

South African business has begun to address the issue of private sector corruption with more vigour. The second report on corporate governance by a committee established by the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa recommended full disclosure of directors' remuneration; in the case of non-executive directors,

Access to information in Southern Africa

The conditions governing public access to information vary widely across the region. South Africa and Namibia have the most comprehensive and liberal legislation. The South African press, which is commercially vibrant and widely read, is much less subject to restrictive legislation than the press in any other Southern African country, where public access to official information is more circumscribed. In Angola and Swaziland, there are no legal provisions governing such access. Strong and independent news media exist in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, but in the first two countries journalists encounter considerable official hostility.

The South African Promotion of Access to Information Act was cited in a dispute between the Democratic Alliance (DA) party and the auditor-general over the latter's refusal to release draft versions of the joint investigative report on arms procurement. The DA was concerned that withholding the draft report would allow the president's office to discreetly amend its contents. During 2000 the Protected Disclosures Act was passed to discourage employer victimisation of whistleblowers.

More threateningly, Zimbabwe's Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act was passed in January 2002 after an initial challenge by the parliamentary legal committee. The law established a media and information commission, appointed by the information ministry, with powers to license journalists – all of whom must be Zimbabwean nationals, including correspondents for foreign newspapers – and ensure they possess appropriate 'qualifications'. As well as penalties for 'spreading rumours' and 'false information', the law prescribes a code of conduct and defines a wide range of 'protected information' to which reporting restrictions apply, including cabinet deliberations. The law also contains tight restrictions on foreign media.[1] Its passage was accompanied by ZANU PF-sponsored demonstrations outside the offices of two independent weeklies in Harare. Meanwhile, the Zimbabwe Public Order and Security Act, another recent law, criminalises criticism of the president and prescribes sentences that include life imprisonment and death.

Defamation of the president is also a

shareholders should first approve disclosure. The report also argued for the strengthening of independent auditing practices, public annual statements on risk management and tighter compliance procedures that include more active participation in shareholder meetings by institutional shareholders, such as pension fund managers.[30]

Private sector corruption surfaced as an electoral issue in Madagascar when one of the presidential contenders, Patrick Rajaonary, made the prevalence of graft a central issue in his manifesto. A former chairman of the industrialists' federation, Rajaonary suggested that under-invoicing of import shipments by local businesses, with the collusion of public officials, was responsible for significant losses to public revenues. Taking its cue from such charges, the government's revenue service temporarily shut down the Tiko Group, Madagascar's largest food processor, accusing it of tax evasion. The move was seen as politically motivated, however, because Tiko's CEO, Marc Ravalomanana, was also the leading opposition candidate for the presidency.[31]

criminal offence in Zambia. In February and June 2002, the relevant section of the Zambian penal code was invoked to charge the editors of *The Post* and *The People* for criticism of presidents Chiluba and Mwanawasa that had included allegations of corruption.[2] A draft freedom of information bill, presented in 2001, was received with scepticism by independent journalists; one section of the bill would exempt civil servants from releasing information that might be 'reasonably expected to cause substantial harm to the legitimate interests of Zambia in areas of foreign policy, defence, security, public safety and monetary policy'.[3] So far the section remains, though the bill has yet to become law.

State antipathy to the independent press extends well beyond Zimbabwe and Zambia. Botswana is widely considered to have a good record on governance, including freedom of expression, but in May 2001 the government announced it would cease to advertise in two independent newspapers after they published articles that accused the vice-president of abusing his authority. In September 2001, though, a Botswana high court ensured the right to freedom of expression when it judged the government's announcement to be unconstitutional. The Botswana government is, however, contemplating the possibility of setting up a restrictive media council.[4]

There was no legal challenge in June 2001 when the Swaziland authorities issued a decree that made the banning of any book, magazine or newspaper 'beyond the scope of legal proceedings' and any ridicule of the king a 'non-bailable' offence. The government went ahead with the banning of *The Guardian of Swaziland*, despite a court ruling to the contrary.[5] In Namibia, officials announced in March 2001 that the government had stopped advertising in the country's only daily newspaper, the *Namibian*, because of its critical disposition.

1 *Star* (South Africa), 1 February 2002.
2 Media Institute of Southern Africa, *Zambia Alert Update*, 12 and 22 February 2002, 7 June 2002.
3 Media Institute of Southern Africa, *Zambia Alert*, 13 March 2001.
4 Committee to Protect Journalists, *Attacks on the Press in 2001* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).
5 *Sunday Independent* (South Africa), 27 January 2002.

In Zambia, as poorly managed privatisations continue, there is a growing fear that dishonest management may become a larger problem as corrupt state enterprises join the private sector. In a survey of Zambian firms very few respondents reported 'traces of corruption' in their enterprises, but business representatives reported otherwise at a workshop in 2001: corruption was 'rampant in the private sector and in civil society', facilitated by a weak regulatory framework and inert shareholders.[32]

In contrast, Lesotho set an important regional precedent in the treatment accorded to international companies offering bribes when it convicted officials in the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA) of accepting them. Following the conviction of LHDA's CEO in June 2002, companies from Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, South Africa and Switzerland were due to go on trial. The South African provincial government of Gauteng subsequently announced that, 'if found guilty of bribery', the companies concerned – which included major civil engineering groups in South Africa – would be disqualified from bidding for contracts in a proposed metropolitan railway.[33]

Civil society

Some of the more encouraging aspects of public life in Southern Africa are the spread of general concern about corruption, both in government and business, and the growing willingness of citizen associations, church bodies and journalists to make major public issues out of corruption cases. In Mauritius, for example, 2,000 people staged a demonstration in October 2001 following the revelation of extensive fraud and corruption in Air Mauritius.[34]

There was concerted criticism by civil rights organisations and churches of government mismanagement in Malawi when it was learned that the National Food Reserve Agency had sold off strategic grain reserves in 2000–01 that are desperately needed to alleviate food shortages. As a consequence, the official anti-corruption authority is now investigating charges of ruling party complicity in irregular sales. But critical voices in Malawi are not immune from persecution: three judges involved in corruption investigations were impeached last year and several journalists attacked.[35]

Official action against civil society institutions is often motivated by the desire to curtail their independence. This may be the case with Zimbabwe's department of education inquiry into the violation of tender procedures during the purchase of Z $11 million (US $205,000) worth of curtains by the University of Zimbabwe Council. A report in March 2002 called for investigations of university officials, several of whom had already been suspended.[36] But at least one scandal involving a civil society organisation arose from concerns within the sector, and not as a consequence of government intervention. The CEO of the Zimbabwe National Network for People with HIV/AIDS was accused in March 2002 of misappropriating Z $40 million (US $750,000) to buy houses for himself. The network is the main beneficiary of public funds from the National AIDS Trust Fund.[37]

A range of surveys by NGOs into the incidence of corruption is probably the best source of intelligence at the disposal of anti-corruption agencies and donors. Much of the research has been undertaken in South Africa. A Kagiso Trust study, commissioned by the Gauteng government, discovered that 90 per cent of 368 poverty eradication projects were run dishonestly, with R 7 million (US $710,000) a year diverted into private pockets; all but a small minority of the projects have been closed down.[38] The institution of regular corruption surveys by such bodies as the Institute for Democracy in South Africa and the Institute for Security Studies has allowed comparison across time in corruption perceptions. As with the surveys conducted by Transparency International, this evidence indicates that the trend was towards an increase in public perceptions of government corruption in 2001.

Transparency International Zimbabwe undertook a survey of 1,500 respondents in 2001, nearly 50 per cent of whom blamed public and private sector corruption for the national economic crisis.[39] In August 2001 the Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa in Zimbabwe published the results of a survey in which a representative sample of officials across the SADC region were asked about the extent of corruption within different professions. The survey found that politicians and police officers were perceived to be the most corrupt.[40]

A major setback for civil society efforts to check official abuses in Zimbabwe was an amendment to the electoral law, which altered the status of domestic electoral monitors and curbed their powers. Under the new legislation, monitors during the March 2002 presidential elections would have to be existing members of government services.[41] Though Zimbabwe's supreme court declared the law unconstitutional, President Mugabe reinstated it. The legislation effectively rules out any possibility of civil society organisations mounting monitoring operations similar to the one conducted by Transparency International Zimbabwe during the 2000 parliamentary elections.[42]

1 *Financial Times* (Britain), 24 January 2002.
2 BBC World Africa, 31 January 2002.
3 *Financial Times* (Britain), 9 April 2002.
4 *Daily Times* (Malawi), 13 March 2002.
5 BBC World Africa, 5 December 2001.
6 Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report*, July 2001, pp. 16–18.
7 *Star* (South Africa), 1 March 2002.
8 The members of SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
9 Phil Matsheza, 'SADC Protocol against Corruption: making it work', paper presented at the 10th International Anti-corruption Conference, Prague, October 2001.
10 Government of Lesotho, Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Rehabilitation, *Programmes for the 2001/2002 Fiscal Year*.
11 Global Witness, *All the Presidents' Men*, March 2002.
12 Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report*, October 2001, p. 13, and *Country Profile*, 2002, p. 11. See also BBC World Africa, 7 March 2002.
13 Michael Meadowcroft, *The European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Statement on the Zambian Elections, 2001* (Lusaka: 5 February 2001); see also Carter Center, Lusaka Field Office, *Final Statement on the Zambian 2001 Elections*, 7 March 2002.
14 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Economic Report on Africa 2002* (Addis Ababa: Economic Commission for Africa, 2002).
15 *Sunday Independent* (South Africa), 17 March 2002.
16 *Mail and Guardian* (South Africa), 15 March 2002.
17 *Sunday Independent* (South Africa), 7 April 2002; see also Commonwealth Secretariat, *Commonwealth Observer Mission Preliminary Statement*, London, 15 March 2002.
18 *Post* (Zambia), 18 March 2002.
19 *Times of Zambia*, 23 February 2002.
20 *Financial Times* (Britain), 8 January 2002.
21 Ibid.
22 *Post* (Zambia), 6 March 2002.
23 Patrick Lawrence, 'Arms deal probe', *Helen Suzman Foundation Focus* 24 (December 2001); Public Protector of South Africa, Auditor-General and National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa, *Joint Investigation Report into the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages*, RP 184/2001, Pretoria, 15 November 2001.
24 *Sunday Independent* (South Africa), 2 September 2001.
25 *Mail and Guardian* (South Africa), 22 March 2002.
26 *Namibian*, 13 February 2002.
27 Philliat Matsheza and Constance Kunaka, *Anti-corruption Mechanisms and Strategies in Southern Africa* (Harare: Human Rights Research and Documentation Trust of Southern Africa, 2000).
28 *Chronicle* (Malawi), 1 April 2002.
29 *Business Report* (South Africa), 26 February 2002.
30 Mervyn King, *The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa*, Institute of Directors of Southern Africa, Johannesburg, March 2002.
31 Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report*, December 2001, pp. 29–31.

32 Papers from this meeting available on www.tizambia.org.zm.
33 *Business Report* (South Africa), 12 May 2002.
34 Panapress, 30 October 2001.
35 *Financial Times* (Britain), 5 March 2002.
36 *Daily News* (Zimbabwe), 25 March 2002.
37 *Herald* (Zimbabwe), 7 March 2002.
38 *Star* (South Africa), 28 February 2002.
39 Africa News Service, 14 February 2002.
40 *Daily News* (Zimbabwe), 10 August 2001.
41 Government of Zimbabwe, *General Laws Amendment Act* 3, sections 4a and 14b, 2001.
42 Transparency International, *The Corruption Fighters' Tool Kit: Monitoring of General Elections in Zimbabwe*, fact sheet, 16 April 2002.