

## TURKEY

**Ercis Kurtulus, Chairman**  
**Toplumsal Saydamlik Hareketi Dernegi (TSHD)**  
**TI Turkey**

### INTRODUCTION

Although corruption in Turkey is not as pervasive as it is in many nearby countries, the absence of political reform efforts and lack of transparency of political institutions are behind the considerable increase of corruption in Turkey in recent decades.

A revision of the Law Governing Political Parties<sup>1</sup> and the Electoral Law<sup>2</sup> would be important steps towards improving the situation, but a radical reform cannot take place without a political commitment to fight corruption. It is widely recognised that these laws and the systems regulating political finance, elections, party membership, candidate selection and encouragement of public participation need serious revision. Measures needed include disclosure requirements to counter the lack of transparency and accountability in political financing. These revisions are the first steps towards the establishment clear and detailed rules regulating the income and expenditures of political parties, at all levels, and the introduction of sanctions in order to deter violations.<sup>3</sup>

#### **The political party system**

A competitive and pluralistic party system has been in operation in Turkey since 1946 and parties are recognised as vital for the democratic life of the country. However, from time to time political leaders have been unable to ensure stability. The Constitution gives the guardianship of Turkish democracy to the Turkish military and there have been three military interventions, the latest in 1980. In 1983, the military stepped aside and the head of the party elected with a majority became the Prime Minister. Since then, however, internal democracy within parties has never been established. One man runs the whole show in every major party: a party leader with his very close cronies decides who will be candidates and therefore who will be the MPs, mayors for every city in Turkey, and party heads of each district. This situation not only weakened the democratic structure of Turkey, but also hampered the fight against corruption.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Law Governing Political Parties No. 3821, 3 July 1992, revised from Law No. 2533 of 1981, revised 1984 and 1992.*

<sup>2</sup> *Law Regarding Basic Regulations on Elections and Voter Registration Lists No. 198 of 16 April 1961 (referred to as Election Law), revised in 1979, 1998, 1993 and 1995 (by Law No. 4125) and related Council of Ministers Decision 426, Art 1/C on High Election Board Principles*

A new constitution was drafted<sup>3</sup> and from 1987 onwards all political parties were allowed to participate in the elections. All parties, provided that they conform to the democratic principles of the Constitution, are allowed to function freely. The banning of a political party and the interdiction of certain candidates is only possible upon the ruling of the Constitutional Court to this effect. The financial auditing of the parties is also under the competency of the Constitutional Court (<http://www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/politicsparties.htm>). This system does not function, however: the audit function should not be under the Constitutional Court but under a separate strong body.

The Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly) has 550 members, elected for a five-year term by proportional representation. All parties can be represented, conditional on a 10 per cent threshold. An effect of this threshold provision was that in the general elections of November 2002 only two parties gained enough votes nationwide to clear the threshold and enter parliament. They together won some 50 per cent of the votes cast. This means that the remaining 50 per cent of voters are not represented in parliament, even though some obtained heavy majorities of the votes in various districts.

### **Administration and Supervision of Elections**

The body responsible for ensuring the fair and orderly conduct of the elections is the Supreme Election Board. The Board is supposed to handle investigations of all irregularities, as well as complaints and objections concerning the elections during and after polling. The Board is composed of seven permanent and four reserve members, six elected by the General Assembly of the Court of Appeals from among its own members, and five are elected by the General Assembly of the Council of State. (<http://www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/politicsparties.htm>). According to a recent OSCE-OECD Report, the Supreme Election Board enjoys an image of impartiality among political parties (OSCE-OECD 2002). It is largely ineffective, however.

### **Parliamentary Immunity**

The Turkish Constitution (Article 83) grants MPs immunity, which unlike some other countries, goes much further than freedom of speech in the conduct of official business, and de facto amounts to “untouchability”. Seated parliamentarians are protected against any arrest, court cases, questioning and incarceration during their entire time in parliament, for all crimes committed while they are in power and even for those crimes committed before their election to parliament. Immunity may only be lifted for each MP by vote within the parliament. This issue was prominent in the news ahead of the November 2002 election and all parties, including the party that won the overwhelming

---

<sup>3</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 5<sup>th</sup> Constitution promulgated on 9 November 1982 in Official Gazette No. 17863, voted by 92% of the electorate in a referendum held on 7 November 1982. The first Turkish Constitution goes back to 1876, the second in 1920.

majority of seats in the election, pledged to limit immunity to “freedom of speech” of parliamentarians during the conduct of parliamentary business.

However, this leading party placed 12 men who had been accused of corruption in government tenders when they were municipal administrators, at the top of election lists in slots where the party was sure to win to avail them of “immunity” (untouchability) until the next election, by which time their crimes would most likely be forgotten. Despite the fact that the issue was part of the electoral programme of the majority party, they recently declared that the issue would not be addressed for the next year.

### **Lack of Public Voice in Determining Election Lists/Parliamentarians, Party Membership, and the Delegate System**

The current political system in Turkey is designed as a network of interest groups, at both the local and national levels. The public has no say in who the party nominates to be their representatives. Party leaders, usually the party chairman, determine who will be placed on the electoral lists, in what order and in which district. In the election, the only choice the voter has is for a specific political party or an independent. Political party heads are therefore much more important than any of the candidates for parliament.

Although any citizen can join a party, they have little say in party matters. There are no effective primary elections by party members. Each district sends party delegates to a general assembly of the party, but these assemblies are not transparent and democratic.

## **II. The problem**

### **1. Major corruption scandals**

Corruption and graft incidents involving politicians in cooperation with high-level bureaucrats and businessmen occur regularly and have been highly publicised by the media. Major corruption scandals and questioning of political and business ethics increased considerably in the mid-1980s when the prime minister adopted a policy of deregulation, favouring foreign investment and reducing state control.

Although many corruption scandals have been highlighted in the press, only a small portion are followed up, fewer are prosecuted, and virtually none in recent years have resulted in sentencing although corruption has increased.

The following is a list of some of the major scandals that occurred during the last two decades:

1980s: The General Director of State Highways was accused of taking bribes for highway construction contracts, cashing at least \$8 million for personal use. The Supreme Court (Yuce Divan) was temporarily convened, but although four of its eleven members (including the current President of Turkey) found him guilty, seven members voted for

his acquittal. A regular court sentenced him to a three-year prison term for 'not explaining the source of his wealth'. He served the time in hospitals.

Ministers of Customs and of Social Affairs were convicted and jailed for accepting bribes for granting public tender contracts.

A minister in PM Ozal's cabinet was accused of taking bribes from a shipping company on the basis of an incriminating telephone conversation, which had been taped by another cabinet member. He was found guilty, removed from parliament and jailed. However, he was not convicted for bribery, but for the misuse of his political position.

1993: The General Director of the Istanbul Water Administration was convicted of bribery and failing to justify his quickly acquired wealth. He was jailed (ISKI scandal).

1998: In a car crash, the passengers of one car were found to be a mafia boss, a police chief (both killed) and an MP. The scandal gave rise to nationwide protests and calls for a clean-up, but the MP was never questioned and prosecutions went nowhere. (<http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/10/30/crime.turkey.reut/>)

1998: Former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller was accused of misuse of power for personal/family gain. In the same period, the leader of the opposition party was accused of misuse of position in the privatisation of a leading state bank, by creating unfair competition allegedly in cooperation with the mafia. In parliament these two parties cleared each other's party leaders of any blame and the matters were covered up. Neither of these parties got enough votes in the November 2002 elections to get over the threshold and enter parliament.

2001: The Gendarmerie, under the co-ordination of the Turkish General Staff, launched Operation White Energy to uncover corruption in the Energy Sector. The energy minister and the construction minister were accused of major bribery in procurement scandals in energy contracts and in construction contracts for replacement houses after the earthquake. The success of the anti-corruption operation was conditional on a political willingness to take a decisive stand against the political figures allegedly involved. The government failed to confront the crisis, however; parliament did not vote to lift immunity and did not let the MPs appear in court. High-level bureaucrats were convicted and sentenced, but nothing happened to the politicians.

2002/2003: The most important scandal in recent years concerns the Uzan family, which owned two major banks, two television stations, one national newspaper, two dams leased from the government to produce electricity, some cement factories and one of two of Turkey's GSM telephone lines. One of the family members established a political party, ran in the November 2002 national elections and received 7 per cent of the votes making it the 4<sup>th</sup> largest party. It did not win any seats in parliament because of the 10 per cent barrier. This political success in such a short time was phenomenal and the party was a clear competitor to the ruling majority party. After the election, the government claimed the family had been involved in wide-ranging corruption, particularly the misuse

of public trust through their two banks. The government took over these two banks and the electrical dams, and started legal procedures against the family. Three of the four members of the family escaped from Turkey but the fourth one, the political party head, remained in Turkey because he had been intentionally abstained from important positions within the family business. It is claimed that the cost of their bank misuse is \$6 billion, which now will be covered by the state. Although there was great corruption apparently involved here, it is clear that the ruling party moved against this family not only because of corruption, but also because of their political success as a rival party. The ruling party has done nothing about similar corruption claims concerning other groups that are not involved in politics.

2003/2004: An important case is the concrete proof of bribery among high-level judges. The party in power has said there is corruption in the courts, while the High Court claimed that the case was politically motivated as an attempt to discredit the justice system. The justice system should not, however, consider itself untouchable and should have taken steps to clean out corruption from within the judiciary. The head of the High Court stated that action would be taken regarding the corruption claims, but months later nothing had been done.

## **2. The major changes in legislation on political finance since 1980**

The Law governing political parties was revised in 1984 and 1992 regarding state subsidies. No amendments or changes were made to the main parts of the financial system, regarding the disclosure of income and expenditure, contributions, and the enforcement of election and funding laws.

In 1999 parliament passed a law against organised crime (Act 4422), which – although it does not relate directly to the finance of political parties – represents an important step towards fighting the influence of organised crime in the political life of the country.

## **3. The major court decisions since 1995 involving Election Law or Financing of Political Parties**

There are various instances in which both the Election Law and the Law on Political Parties have been applied, primarily in order to ban political parties on legal and constitutional grounds.

The primary case involved a religiously motivated political party which has been periodically banned for 25 years by the Constitutional Court for threatening the nation's secular system of government, and had been re-established several times under different names and re-banned. A party with an important position in parliament is considered to be the successor of this religiously motivated political party. When the religious party was banned in January 1998, the Constitutional Court decided that it would have to refund the state subsidies it had received. However, the funds disappeared and there was no reimbursement.

#### **4. Major public debates since 2000**

In recent years, political corruption has been in the newspaper headlines almost daily and there several serious accusations have been levied against politicians. However, legal immunity (criminal untouchability) of MPs is a huge obstacle to the correct functioning of the legal system, as accusations against politicians cannot be followed-up. Many people believe that political parties pay only lip service to anti-corruption efforts while covering up actual incidents and acquitting each other's parties. Recently political corruption has stopped hitting the headlines, and several reporters critical of the current party in power since the November 2002 elections have reportedly been fired. Ownership of the press in Turkey is concentrated in the hands of a few commercial families, which are heavily indebted to the government and therefore are not independent.

Conferences and other activities of TSHD (TI-Turkey), and especially the release of the Corruption Perception Index, led to headlines in the newspapers, articles by columnists and television and radio interviews. TSHD carried out a programme of public conferences on specific areas of political transparency as well as other areas of corruption and good governance, such amendments to the state procurement law, which have helped keep corruption on the public agenda.

The current majority party prepared an Emergency Action Plan in January 2003 including an anti-corruption strategy. It has passed an access to information law and is currently preparing a draft anti-corruption law and the Ministry of Justice has requested the cooperation of TSHD. The draft law only establishes a commission which will determine principles and actions.

### **III. Transparency**

#### **1. Parties and candidates' reports on finance**

Candidates are not legally bound to submit any reports on their finances. In accordance with the Political Parties Law Articles 74 and 75, parties are required to submit only a summary balance sheet to the Constitutional Court, which is one-page long and gives no details. Moreover, this balance sheet is not officially audited nor made available to the public.

Another issue of critical importance is that the figures on donations both to parties and to party candidates are not disclosed and there is no information about the extent of donations from abroad.

Due to the lack of transparency, it is not possible to know the extent of party income and expenditures. However, from the various pieces of information about the campaign that can be collected, it appears that the party that won the election and other parties spent considerable amounts.

On 3 January 2003 the majority party in power passed an 'Emergency Action Plan' aimed at thoroughly revising activities in the state, including a section on the fight against

corruption with an item on "Bringing Transparency to Political Financing". This was scheduled to be completed by January 2004 by the Ministry of Justice, which is drafting an anti-corruption law. However, there are counter indications in the April 2003 report by an investigative journalist of a last-minute cryptic rider attached to a revision of the tax-debt forgiveness law, which would have resulted in erasing huge amounts of tax owed by two companies close to the ruling party. The clause had not been seen by opposition party MPs, but by-passed parliament and was sent to the president, who vetoed it. As a result, parliament was obliged to delete this article before returning the bill to the president.

## **2. Declaration of assets**

According to the Council of Ministers' decision no.90/748 bureaucrats, judges, prosecutors, CPAs, and elected representatives must declare their assets.<sup>4</sup> Elected representatives submit their written statements of wealth and income to the parliamentary administration offices. But there is no requirement to declare partnerships or memberships that may come into conflict with public duties. Research shows that the public believes that elected representatives are not transparent about the sources of their wealth. This belief is sustained by cases such as that of a party chairman, former professor, and prime minister, from a middle-class family, who was summoned to answer where she got money to buy property in the United States and Turkey. She responded that her mother had a large sum of money in a bundle hidden away, which she inherited. This was so absurd that she was not questioned about why she did not pay the inheritance tax. Since her party and others in previous coalition governments did not pass the 10 per cent threshold in the November 2002 elections, these politicians are no longer MPs and are no longer are protected by immunity. However, there has as yet been no movement towards disclosure policies and no prosecutions for corruption leading to accumulation of wealth.

## **IV.POLITICAL ETHICS**

One of the prerequisites for a clean society is a clean political system. In order to be an example for the society, politicians have to be clean. In Turkey, a saying gaining increasing popularity is, "the fish stinks from the head."

Two decades ago, if a person wanted to have a place in ruling the country he became a politician, but if he wanted to get rich, he entered the commercial world. In recent years, however, this has turned upside down and a person who wants to get rich might enter politics. Over the past twenty years we have witnessed examples of thousands of dollars in gifts to politicians who have gotten their hands on political power. Even the Prime Minister is a partner of commercial firms and established new commercial partnerships after his election to power. He openly defends his right to do this by saying he cannot make his livelihood if he does not make commerce.

---

<sup>4</sup> Regulation on the Declaration of Assets 'Council of Ministers Decision No. 90/748 dated October 1990, based on Law No. 3628, 29 April 1990.

In order for integrity to be the ruling principle in public life and also in the public sector, the first thing to do is to ensure the basis of clean politics. The prerequisites for a clean political system are:

Basic ethical rules

Guidelines on what politicians can and cannot do

There have been many draft laws on these issues through the years, but they have never been approved by parliament. Turkey has no political ethics law, no limitations on immunity and no safeguards against conflicts of interests.

## **V. FINANCE**

### **A. Donations**

#### **1. Limits on individual and corporate donations to candidates or political parties**

In accordance with the Political Parties Law Article 66, a maximum of 7.2 billion TL (some \$4,000) may be donated by individuals or corporations to political parties. Public institutions and organisations, and local administrations may not donate real estate, goods, money or rights to political parties. Moreover parties cannot legally receive assistance or donations of cash or goods from foreign states, international organisations, foreign associations, groups or institutions and citizens (*Facts about Turkey*).

However, it is widely believed that huge donations are made covertly, especially to party headquarters, often in the forms of personal gifts or services. Marriage gifts, payment of US university tuition fees for the children of politicians are but a few examples of how donations may be disguised. The latest example was the US university tuition for the three children of the Prime Minister, paid for by a businessman at an annual cost of over \$100,000. This example encourages the common practice of government employees receiving gifts from business people. Indeed, in order to support their electoral campaign candidates establish relationships with the business world, the media and sometimes with organised crime.

#### **2. Legislation and/or court decisions on lobbying or trading in influence**

The law on lobbying covers unions and association, but not individuals or businesses. It does not cover trading in influence. However, lobbying and trading in influence appear to be rampant in Turkey. There are frequent newspaper headlines about the close ties between politicians and businessmen resulting in awards of public contracts, investment and export incentives and tax exclusions, and even influencing the content of regulations.

### **B. Public Finance and Media**

#### **1. Direct state subsidies to parties**

Article 68 of the Constitution as modified in 1985 states that ‘The state provides sufficient financial assistance to political parties, distributed fairly. The state contribution, political party membership fees, and conditions of grants are regulated by law’. The total

funding for parties amounts to 2/5000 of the total budget revenues in the annual budget. A prerequisite for receiving these subsidies is that the party must pass the threshold of 10 per cent of total votes. A more modest subsidy goes to parties that win between 7–10 per cent of votes. The distribution is calculated based on the percentage of votes won in the previous election and the number of representatives in parliament. The state grant currently amounts to more than \$40 million. Double this amount is given in an election year. In addition, if at least three MPs combine to establish a party (by resigning from other parties, if they are not independent, which is rare) they also qualify for a subsidy.

## **2. Indirect state subsidies to parties**

In Turkey there are no indirect state subsidies to parties, such as free postage, nor tax relief on donations.

## **3. Media space and state subsidies**

The election laws, the Law on the Establishment and Broadcasting of Radio and Television Enterprises and the Law on the Supreme Board of TV and Radio establish the basic framework for media coverage of the elections, with the aim of ensuring fair representation to all parties.

Each party has the right to free broadcasting on the state television station (TRT). They are allowed two 10-minute speeches on radio and television. Parties with a group in the parliament may broadcast an additional 10-minute speech. Additional time is granted to the party in power (20 minutes), to other parties in a governing coalition (15 minutes), and to the major opposition party (10 minutes). No paid political advertising on radio or television is permitted. In the seven days prior to election the prohibition on coverage of political parties and candidates applies.

Although legally the media must not broadcast political advertisements within a specific period prior to an election, there is evidence that certain actors, especially television channels, ignore this prohibition. Newspapers and television channels whose owners are associated with certain political parties, show their preferences for their political party and publicise their candidates with supposed “news” items.

The Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK) monitors all nation-wide election broadcasts, and sends periodic evaluation reports to the SBE regarding the coverage of the campaign by the media. The Supreme Board of Elections is empowered to impose sanctions on national broadcasters, while Provincial Election Boards could sanction local radio and television. Before the November 2002 election, the Board closed down three stations owned by a family that established a political party.

In Turkey, media concentration is a problem, which adds considerably to corruption. All newspapers and nearly all television channels are privately owned. There are nearly 10 major national daily newspapers, but virtually none of them are independent. Most are owned by three commercial families, which also own prominent television channels and use these powerful media assets to

pressure political powers for their commercial gain, for instance in securing procurement contracts. Others newspapers and television channels are owned by religious interests.

## **2. Provisions against the influencing of elections through abuse of power and government resources**

The Law Regarding Prohibited Actions Before Elections, which prevents politicians from using government vehicles or official ceremonies for political campaign purposes, appears to be largely followed. However, inevitably political leaders manage to use their activities for political propaganda since their activities are news-making.

Direct manipulation of votes at the polls does not occur. Although there have been allegations that votes are bought by politicians and political parties, blatant vote buying with government funds at the polls is not known. Before elections, however, the parties in power try to influence certain voter sectors with tactics known worldwide such as raising prices for agricultural products produced in their voting areas, raising wages or allocating money for investments in election areas, all of these financed from the national budget.

## **3. Limits on expenditure**

Although there is no limit to party and candidate expenditure, according to the Constitution the income and the expenses of the political parties must be in compliance with their objectives. The Constitution has given the Constitutional Court the function and authority to audit the finances of the political parties. The Constitutional Court carries out this function in the framework of the Political Parties Law (*Facts on Turkey*).

# **VI. Oversight, Sanctions and Enforcement**

## **1. Oversight institutions**

The Constitutional Court was established by the Constitution of 1961. Its role is to examine all laws to ensure that they conform to the Constitution. Its tasks include the financial auditing of political parties. The constitutional court can close down a political party on the basis of cases filed by the Public Prosecutor of the Republic. Sanctions can be both of an administrative and criminal nature.

The Constitutional Court, as well as the Supreme Court, is empowered to try offences related to the functions of the President, the members of the Council of Ministers, the members and Chief Judges of the Constitutional Court, the Court of Appeals, the Council of State, the Military Tribunal of Appeals, the Supreme Military Administrative Court, the Court of Accounts and the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, as well as Chief Public Prosecutors of these Courts, and also the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic. The Chief Public Prosecutor and his Deputy act in the capacity of prosecutor in the proceedings of this court. (<http://www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/politicsjdccourt.htm>).

Although the Constitutional Court is considered to have preserved its independence, its financial and human resources are considered insufficient to adequately meet all of its tasks. It will only be able to exercise its oversight function or pursue cases in rare cases. One exception was the banning of a political party in 1998, which was subsequently required to return state subsidies. The Constitutional Court determined that through trickery the party 'evaporated' the funds. In order to trace the funds and get the reimbursement, the intervention of the National Audit Authority (Sayistay/Court of Accounts) would have been required, but this did not occur. Although there is a provision for the Constitutional Court to cooperate with the Court of Accounts, this does not happen in practice.

## **2. Independence of prosecutors and judges**

According to Article 9 of the Constitution, judicial power is exercised by independent courts on behalf of the Turkish Nation (Articles 138-160).

Accordingly no authority, office or individual may give orders or instructions to courts or judges relating to the exercise of judicial power. Article 139 of the Constitution protects the tenure and other rights of judges and Public prosecutors.

The Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors deals with the admission of judges and public prosecutors of courts of justice and administrative courts into the profession. It also deals with appointments, transfers, the delegation of temporary powers, promotion and the allocation of posts. It can debar people from the profession and impose disciplinary penalties and removal from office.

However, the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors is chaired by the Minister of Justice, who is an MP and a member of a political party. The Undersecretary to the Minister of Justice, appointed by the Minister, is an ex-officio member of the Council. Thus, there is a strong link between the Court and politics, raising doubts about its actual independence.

In addition, prosecutors can be taken off a case and moved to another. Before the latest election, a prosecutor who was handling an important case of political corruption was harassed by constant press coverage in a number of biased non-independent newspapers about allegations of an extra-marital affair. (His indiscretion was videotaped and was possibly a planned entrapment). This harassment led to public reaction: the public appeared to give much more importance to his official duties. He was nevertheless removed from this important corruption case.

## **VII. Conclusions**

Political corruption has gravely affected all parts of Turkish society. It has led to a sharp decline in confidence in politicians; it weakens the political stability of the country and fuels economic difficulties. Political and government officials and the press calculate that corruption in Turkey has cost the country a minimum of \$150 billion in recent years, particularly through siphoning off bank funds.

Those few politicians, high-level bureaucrats, judges and others who take the risk of struggling against corruption are often purged from office and their careers. Although the ruling party has not kept its pre-election promise to abolish immunity, it has prepared an Emergency Action Plan including anti-corruption measures, and is working on a draft anti-corruption law. In addition, it is the only party to show any financial information on its web site, although this is too general and incomplete to be useful. Their strong majority in parliament gives the party a singular opportunity to reverse the corruption situation in Turkey. The extent of their commitment to real anti-corruption efforts remains to be seen.

In the past decade all anti-corruption efforts appear to have been used as political weapons to damage opposition parties, not to set principles and implement systemic improvements in a general movement towards a clean society. The current ruling party appears to be taking the same dead-end road.

Overall, a new focus on public accountability, openness and transparency of political institutions would represent an enormous step towards creating a more democratic and economically stable Turkish society. We hope that all parties, especially the majority party, will take up the solution of this critical problem, not as a party matter but as a matter of grave national importance.

## References

Aktan, Coşkun Can, Yolsuzlukla Mücadele Stratejileri, Hak-İş Yayınları, Ankara 2002

Aktan, Coşkun Can, 'Siyasal Yozlaşmaların İnlenmesine Yönelik Çözüm Önerleri' Yeni Türkiye, page 15 (Siyasette Yozlaşma Özel Sayısı II) Ankara 1997

Alkan Türker, Siyasal Ahlak ve Siyasal Ahlaksızlık, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara 1999

Articles, pronouncements, and summaries of Toplumsal Saydamlik Hareketi Dernegi (Civil Society Transparency Movement Association) (TSHD), which is Transparency International (TI)-Turkey. Summaries can be found on the TSHD web site [www.saydamlik.org](http://www.saydamlik.org)

ATO, Yolsuzluk Kıskaçında Türkiye, ATO Yayını, Ankara 2001

Ayata, Ayşe Güneş, 'Siyasette Kollamacılık' Siyasal Ahlak ve Siyasal Ahlaksızlık, (Der.T.Alkan) Bilgi Yayinevi, Ankara 1993

Dülger, Mehmet, 'Siyası Partilerin ve Seçim Kampanyalarının Finansman' Siyasal Partiler ve Demokrasi TESAV Yayını, Ankara 1995 Pages 54-56

Devlet Denetleme Kurulu Yolsuzluklarla Mücadeleye Yardımcı Olmak Maksudıyla Alınması Gereken Tedbirlere İlişkin İnceleme Raporu, D.Denet, Krl.Yay.NoŞ 2i Ankara 1996

Kurtuluş, Erciş '2000 Yüzlün Türkiyeeye Kötü Mirası -Yolsuzluk ve Rüşvet 23 Eylül 2000 Tarhinde Ankara ÖTDÜ'de düzenlenen 'Türkiye'de Etkin Yönetim ve Yolsuzlukla Mücadelerin Geliştirilmesi' konulu konferansa sunulan bildiri

OSCE-ODIR, REPUBLIC OF TURKEY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 3 November 2002 OSCE/ODIHR Assessment Report ([http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/reports/election\\_reports/tr/tr\\_par\\_nov2002.php](http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/reports/election_reports/tr/tr_par_nov2002.php))

Türkiye Genç İş Adamları Derneği, 1000İli Yıllarla Doğru Türkiye'nin Önde Gelen Sorunlarına Yaklaşımlar Kamu Yönetiminde Yozlaşma ve Rüşvet, Nisan 1997

## WEBSITES

Turkish News Agency, *Facts about Turkey* (<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/kitaplar/isteturkiye/default.htm>)

Turkish Embassy at Washington DC.  
(<http://www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/politicsjdccourt.htm>)  
<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/952198/posts>

Toplumsal Saydamlik Hareketi Dernegi (Civil Society Transparency Movement Association) (TSHD), which is Transparency International (TI)-Turkey website [www.saydamlik.org](http://www.saydamlik.org)

## **VI. SOURCE MATERIAL**

5th Constitution of the Turkish Republic, 9th November 1982  
Law Governing Political Parties No. 3821 revised on 3rd July 1992  
Law Regarding Basic Regulations on Elections and Voter Registration Lists No. 298 of 26 April 1961 (referred to as Election Law), revised in 1979, 1987, 1998, 1993 and 1995 (by Law No. 4125) and related Council of Ministers Decision 426, Art 2/C on High Election Board Principles.  
Law on Turkish Radio and Television No.3984, 13 April 1994, Article 4, amended by Law 4756 of 15 May 2002  
Regulation on Declaration of Assets, Council of Ministers Decision No. 90/745, 10 October 1990  
TSHD (TI-Turkey) files and archives of news articles